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An approach to assessing the resilience of the water service in England 
and Wales – Can we answer the question: is the service resilient or 
brittle? 
 
“A chain is no stronger than its weakest link; but if you show how 
admirably the last few are united together, half the world will forget 
to test the security of the equally essential parts which are kept out 
of sight.” 
(The Cornhill Magazine, 1868) 
 
 
 
Synopsis 
 
This research considers the concept of resilience and the extent to which the 
resilience of a water supply system can be assessed. A method of assessing 
water service resilience is developed and tested for the water service in 
England and Wales. This is done by analysis of service performance data 
over time and by examination of one particular system. As part of this, a group 
of features which you would expect to see as part of a resilient water supply 
system is explained and defined. The research concludes that it is possible to 
arrive at a view of the level of resilience of service by looking at performance 
data and processes and systems against a set of criteria. The research also 
concludes that there is more evidence to support the argument that the water 
service in England and Wales is more resilient than in the past. Some further 
areas for research into the resilience of the water service are noted, and ideas 
for how a more in-depth analysis of resilience might be carried out are 
suggested.
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Introduction 
 
1.1. Research aims 
 
This research explored methods for assessing the resilience of a water 
service, and sought to assess the degree to which the water service in a 
region of England and Wales can be said to be resilient. The aim was to 
develop a method of assessing the resilience of the water service, apply this 
method to an area of England and Wales, and arrive at conclusions about 
how far the resilience of a complex system which covers a large geographical 
area can be assessed. 
 
Delivery of the water service is measured through a number of key 
performance indicators in companies and by regulators. The most important of 
these relate to the ‘guaranteed standards of service’ which customers are 
entitled to receive. These guaranteed standards relate primarily to water 
pressure, interruptions and customer contact1. Customer contact covers 
issues like appointments and response to correspondence which is not in the 
scope of this work. In addition to the guaranteed standards of service there 
are also guaranteed drinking water standards which customers are entitled 
to2. This research focuses on the delivery of the three key elements of those 
guaranteed standards: 
 The supply of potable water to domestic customers on demand and 
without interruption. 
 The supply of potable water to domestic customers at adequate flow 
rate and pressure; i.e. at a minimum rate of 9 litres per minute and a 
minimum pressure of 0.7 bar. 
 The supply of potable water to domestic customers which complies 
with the European Drinking Water Directive standards as specified and 
enforced by the Drinking Water Inspectorate: i.e. those set out in 
schedule 1 of the Water Supply Regulations 2000 (as amended). 
Although guaranteed standards also cover expectations of the sewerage 
service, that has not been considered in this study. The research also does 
not focus specifically on the service provided to non-domestic customers, i.e. 
business and industry. However it is clear that the services are interlinked and 
some time has been devoted to examining differences in the levels of 
resilience of the service delivered to domestic and non-domestic customers. 
 
The research examined the ability of the existing systems in the water sector 
to maintain supply, pressure and water quality in the context of the risks of 
external changes in circumstances. In recognition of the fact that it is 
impossible to eliminate all risks to service, and that small-scale, low 
materiality service failures are a recognised and accepted part of the current 
                                                 
1 For more information about guaranteed standards of service see The Water 
Supply and Sewerage Services (Customer Service Standards) Regulations 
2008 (SI 2008/594).  
2
 For more information about the standards required of a potable water supply see The water 
supply (Water Quality) regulations 2000 (SI 2000/3184). 
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national water service, the focus was on resilience to service failures which 
affect more than just a handful of properties or which have high 
consequences, such as public health impacts. This work therefore excluded 
investigation of issues like small-scale pressure interruptions, planned 
interruptions or non-harmful discolouration. 
 
The research sought to determine the degree to which current infrastructure 
arrangements, business-as-usual practices, capital maintenance regimes, 
emergency planning and staff, skills, equipment and institutional 
arrangements can be said to minimise the risks to service and therefore make 
the water service resilient. 
 
Some observers, such as the think-tank DEMOS have argued that our society 
as a whole in the UK is brittle and that this is primarily because of our reliance 
on dense networks to provide us with water and other services. DEMOS have 
asserted that “Our everyday lives and the national infrastructure which they 
rely on operate in a fragile union, vulnerable to even the smallest disturbances 
in the network.” (Edwards, 2009). Similarly professional bodies such as the 
Institution of Civil Engineers (‘ICE’) have made numerous calls for step-
changes in activity with the aim of increasing service resilience in areas such 
as water. For example, with regard specifically to flooding the ICE have stated 
that “Economic and regulatory forces have reduced investment in new 
infrastructure to the point where there is no longer any spare capacity 
available to provide alternative sources of power or water treatment should 
key utilities be compromised by flooding.” (ICE, 2010). 
 
On the other hand, service performance information collected by regulators 
suggests that the water service is actually much more resilient than in the 
past. Risk-based approaches to asset operation and maintenance and 
precautionary pro-active investment in areas such as water quality have led to 
demonstrably higher standards, stable serviceability and substantial 
headroom. Wide-scale service failures are relatively rare and the regulator 
Ofwat has stated that “services are… safer, better and more secure than ever 
before” (Ofwat, 2010). 
 
Since this diversity of opinion might lead to some uncertainty, it becomes 
necessary to seek a reliable method by which to determine the extent to 
which the water service is resilient and whether this has improved or 
deteriorated over time. 
 
1.2. Research objectives 
 
The aim of the research was to investigate whether it is possible to assess the 
resilience of the water service in England and Wales. The objectives to meet 
this aim were to apply and evaluate a top-level analytical approach and 
develop and test a qualitative method of assessing water service resilience. 
Through doing this, the research sought to generate some ideas on useful 
ways to approach an assessment of current resilience as a first step to setting 
longer-term targets for resilience. 
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The research was split into three phases: 
1. Literature review. 
2. Analysis of data on service failures and empirical failures of resilience. 
3. Development and testing of an approach to assessing existing service 
resilience. 
 
The first phase was the literature review which was necessary to frame the 
question and research aims and establish what had already been done on the 
subject. The focus of this phase was to reach a usable definition of resilience, 
describe the state of knowledge in the sectors and analyse existing 
approaches to assessing resilience. 
 
The second phase looked at national information about the number of service 
failures experienced by customers over the past two decades and presented 
some analysis of how patterns of service disruption have changed over the 
past twenty years. Based on this data the research also discussed historic 
events in England during the last 40 years where the water service as defined 
above has failed on a significant scale. This helped establish a range of the 
plausible external hazards which can reduce the water service and provided 
an insight into how able the whole sector is to learn from service failures and 
increase overall resilience in response to actual failures. 
 
Phase three of the research focussed on developing an assessment approach 
for resilience by looking at principles of resilience and developing expectation 
criteria. This assessment approach was then tested by applying it based on a 
study of infrastructure arrangements, operational practices, case studies and 
emergency plans at one water company. This included a study of the 
company’s strategic business plan, water resource management plan, climate 
change adaptation plan and internal process documents, reports and 
discussions with company representatives. 
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2. Phase 1 – Literature Review 
 
2.1. Approach 
 
A literature review on the subject of resilience turns up a broad and diverse 
range of research across many different academic disciplines. It is a term 
used in psychological health, economics, social sciences, ecology, 
engineering and emergency planning. Whilst its meaning in all these contexts 
is similar, it is not the same. The first step of the review was to establish a 
definition which is workable and applicable to the water sector. The second 
step was to look at any methods for assessing resilience which have been 
used and whether these had been applied to a water service. 
 
2.2. Definitions 
 
Resilience has been variously defined and its conceptualization in recent 
years has been called “fuzzy and contested” (White, 2010). It shares 
similarities with ‘sustainable development’ in that it is frequently used as an 
umbrella concept to describe a broad array of interrelated issues (Dovers and 
Handmer, 1992). For example the breadth of research interests evidenced by 
the ‘Resilience Alliance’ - a body of multi-disciplinary academics promoting 
and linking research on “social-ecological systems in order to discover 
foundations for sustainability” (Resilience Alliance, 2011) gives some 
impression of how wide-ranging a subject resilience is considered to be. In 
order to usefully define resilience for the water sector it is necessary to look at 
its origins and the current academic uses of the term. Perhaps more 
importantly, it is also necessary to look at the current applications of the term 
in policy and applied fields. 
 
The term resilience in its modern sense has its roots in ecology and was 
defined by CS Holling in 1973 as a property of an ecological system which “is 
a measure of the ability of these systems to absorb changes of state 
variables, driving variables, and parameters, and still persist.” Holling 
separates resilience from 'stability' so that an ecosystem may be resilient but 
not stable. This definition relies on defining the system under examination and 
understanding the links between that system and the functions and processes 
which might affect it. These are the links which need to be examined in order 
to assess resilience. 
 
There are a host of academics who have attempted to arrive at workable 
definitions of resilience for use when considering socio-ecological systems 
like a water supply system. For example, after a lengthy review of the various 
uses of the term, Klein arrived at a definition of resilience as the amount of 
disturbance a system can absorb and remain within the same state and the 
“degree to which that system is capable of self-organisation”; self organisation 
meaning not requiring external influence to maintain the system, for example 
government interference (Klein, 2003). 
 
Building on the work of Klein and others (for example Adger, 2000 and Pelling, 
2003) resilience can be defined as a measure of the ability of a system to 
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absorb changes whilst performing its intended functions. If such a system’s 
functions are compromised due to a change in circumstances, it may be 
deemed not resilient enough to cope with whatever the change was that 
caused the failure. This means that the concept of resilience links very 
strongly with risk management, but that it is “a lesser function within the risk 
framework” (White, 2010). What is meant by this is that resilience is 
dependent on risk and is one factor which affects the risk borne by a system. 
The degree of resilience which a system might require is actually a contingent 
question, depending on risk and risk appetite. To investigate the resilience of 
a service therefore requires an investigation of the systems required for the 
delivery of that service and the risks associated with these systems. These 
systems include the infrastructure networks themselves, the practices and 
procedures of the operators, the critical external dependencies and relevant 
institutional arrangements. Therefore studying resilience can be treated as an 
application of systems theory, as explored by Bertalanffy (1963) and others 
since. 
 
The concept of resilience has been further broken down into two streams, 
which have been termed the “equilibrium” and “non-equilibrium” paradigms 
(Pickett et al, 2004). Put simply, these views are that resilience is either the 
ability of a system to 'bounce-back' after a disturbance or the ability of a 
system to absorb gradual changes in circumstance (White, 2010). Hollnagel 
et al. (2006) argue that resilience encompasses both of these streams and 
that organisations would be successful if they were able to “recognise, adapt 
to and absorb variations, changes, disturbances, disruptions and surprises”. 
In these terms, resilience means not simply being able to react well, but also 
proactively anticipating and acting to cope with potential risks. 
 
The definition used by the Government Cabinet Office in its most recent work 
on national infrastructure however tends towards the ‘equilibrium’ definition. 
Its definition is that “Resilience is the ability of assets, networks and systems 
to anticipate, absorb, adapt to and / or rapidly recover from a disruptive 
event.” (Cabinet Office, 2011). Use of the term ‘disruptive event’ shows that 
what is in mind when resilience is being discussed is not a gradual change in 
circumstance, but rather specific event hazards. In this policy context the 
‘non-equilibrium’ definition is more commonly referred to as ‘adaptation’. 
Adaptation and its links with resilience are explored in more detail later on. 
 
Current understanding in the water and sewerage sectors in England and 
Wales is based on the Cabinet Office definition with the additional proviso that 
resilience actions are those which aim to protect the service from the effects 
of hazards that are predominantly beyond the control of the water companies 
who control the water supply systems (Ofwat, 2010). A hazard is defined as 
any type of event which disrupts the normal activities of human society and 
natural habitats (Balica et al, 2009). The focus on service is important 
because it means that resilience is not just focused on the ability of individual 
system components to function as intended. The Cabinet Office explains that 
resilience is the sum of four main system characteristics shown in figure1: 
resistance, reliability, redundancy and response (2011). Resistance is 
specific protection such as flood walls, redundancy consists of spare capacity 
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such as backup systems, and reliability consists of designing system 
components such that they can operate in a wide range of circumstances. 
Response activity consists of emergency plans, and ensuring the right 
corporate culture and skills exist to be able to react in the event of a hazard.  
 
Figure1: Cabinet Office classification of resilience characteristics and 
the ‘resilience cycle’. 
 
Source: Cabinet Office 2011 
 
There are however, other points of view on this subject and in technical terms 
resilience is usually defined more narrowly. Its technical uses tend to be more 
closely in line with the original dictionary definition as “the act of springing 
back”; so in mechanical engineering it relates to the energy absorbed by a 
material at its elastic limit (OED, 2011). Hashimoto et al, (1982) and Bogardi 
and Kundzewicz (2002) define resilience as a measure of how fast a system 
is likely to return to a satisfactory state. They therefore separate it from 
reliability and vulnerability. In their work on water resource systems resilience 
is a specific conditional probability that a satisfactory state will return in a 
given time period. These uses are more niche technical definitions of less 
common usage at the level under investigation in this research. For that 
reason the wider definition, incorporating the four system characteristics as 
set out above, has been used here. These categories have been used to 
structure the research described in the work plan below. 
 
Brittleness as a term has less provenance than resilience but can be defined 
simply as its opposite. It has been used in this sense in the literature, 
particularly with regard to ecological systems (for example see Gunderson 
and Holling, 2001) and by Fiering with regard to water resource systems 
(1982). A brittle service is one which is stopped or substantially deteriorated 
by even small changes in external circumstance. A brittle service cannot be 
maintained when subjected to external hazards and challenges to its normal 
operation and is less able to return to a satisfactory state. 
 
It is possible to conceive of brittleness and resilience as two ends of a scale, 
with a fully brittle system only able to operate under completely static 
conditions and a fully resilient system able to operate under any 
circumstances. A highly-sensitive, controlled, scientific experiment might 
therefore be said to be highly brittle, where as a bitumen road is relatively, 
much more resilient. 
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2.3. Links with other branches of study 
 
The degree of resilience in a system is determined by a range of attributes, 
systems, processes and norms and it therefore links very strongly with many 
areas of study where the concept is sometimes not overtly considered. 
Resilience does share some similarities with the concept of sustainability, the 
meaning of which has never been specific enough to form the basis of a 
commonly-accepted methodologically-based assessment. This is partly 
because, as with resilience, its exact meaning is significantly influenced by the 
education, experience and culture of the individual who seeks to apply its 
principles (Filho 2000). However, unlike for resilience, engineering companies 
and policy makers have developed a range of methods which seek to assess 
the ‘sustainability’ of projects and infrastructure; for example Arup’s ‘SpeAR’ 
(2011) and the BREEAM environmental assessment (2008) advocate the use 
of a mix of qualitative and quantitative assessments against sets of given 
criteria. As discussed later a similar approach might be possible for 
assessment of resilience. 
 
Fields of study in asset management are a very important area of overlap 
since in providing a water service the configuration, condition and operation of 
the various assets are fundamental in determining reliability, resistance and 
redundancy. Considerations in good practice asset management are 
explained in detail in BSI PAS55 (2008). Examination of good practice in asset 
management suggests that resilience is one objective of asset management 
(although it may not be considered as such), to be balanced alongside other 
objectives such as cost efficiency and regulatory compliance. Related to the 
assets in the system, obvious areas of importance in a resilience context are 
the specific tolerances, allowances and safety factors. The design 
specifications of assets and their performance against these specifications 
plays a big role in determining the resilience of the system which relies on 
those assets. There is extensive technical research on these subjects, both 
relating to the general concepts and the specifics associated with assets in 
use in the water service but a review of this work was out of scope for this 
research. 
 
Resilience is very closely related to the fields of risk assessment of 
management, subjects on which there has been a great deal more research. 
As Blackmore et al. (2008) note there are intuitive similarities between risk 
assessment and resilience concepts and it is therefore important to 
understand the research which has been done in this area in order to begin to 
look at how resilience might be assessed. Assessing and managing risk is an 
inherent part of any human activity and there has been detailed academic 
study into the practice of assessing risks and processes for managing risks for 
decades (see for example Lowrance, 1976 and Rowe, 1977). In engineering 
contexts over the past few decades, managing organizational risks, and 
particularly health and safety risks to employees has led to lots of research 
into methods of reducing risks in complex systems, often driven by national 
policy (Reason, 1997). As a consequence of the great body of research into 
the nature and management of risks, and an almost unanimous recognition by 
policy-makers and regulators that risk-based approaches tend to lead to more 
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stable service and more efficient solutions than a reactive approach to failures 
(see for example ISO 31000, 2009), complex risk assessment and 
management approaches have become common practice in the water sector3. 
 
The key differences between risk management and resilience have been 
explored in the literature. Blackmore et al. (2008), argued that the key 
hallmark of a ‘resilience approach’ to systems analysis as opposed to a risk-
based approach is that it is a holistic approach which considers whole-of-
system performance. Blackmore et al. describe a number of ways in which a 
purely risk-assessment driven approach might be more limited than a risk-
based approach. However, as explained above, resilience is really a sub-
component of risk and ‘resilience approaches’ have a number of 
shortcomings, most notably the fact that overall system resilience is much 
more difficult to quantify and validate than any individual risk. Logically, one 
way of assessing resilience would be to carry out a comprehensive risk 
assessment relating to the system under discussion. In doing this you would 
be developing an understanding of what the threats to that system are and 
what mitigants already exist which help deal with those risks (Hollnagel, 
2004). A comprehensive risk assessment should therefore be a ‘resilience 
approach’ as Blackmore et al. define it. However it is clear that for any 
complex system this is inevitably a very difficult and time-consuming exercise. 
 
Emergency management is another area where there is a clear overlap 
particularly with the response element of resilience. This field is also known as 
business continuity planning and there are clear and consensus-driven 
principles and systems associated with this concept which have been 
established in the UK in recent years (most notably by the BSI in BS 25999:1, 
2006 and BS 25999:2, 2007). Some sections of the literature focus entirely on 
this response element and how it can be assessed and improved in a 
complex system (for example the work of Knott and Fox, 2010). Research in 
this field has been used to develop the resilience of systems by increasing the 
effectiveness of a system’s response to hazards. 
 
As noted in the section on definitions, resilience also has very strong links 
with the concept of adaptation, and is particularly closely associated with 
adaptation to climate change. Indeed adaptation can be seen as simply 
another term for the ‘non-equilibrium’ definition of resilience. The concept of 
adaptation has gained in importance over the past few years as the 
predictions of increasing climate risks have become widely accepted by 
politicians, by the public and in the academic communities operating outside 
climate science. Consequently there has been a burgeoning literature on this 
subject during the last decade and in much of this improving overall system 
                                                 
3
 For example every water company in England and Wales applies the principles of the capital 
maintenance planning common framework, which was developed by UKWIR in 2002 and 
advocated by Ofwat, in its maintenance planning. Further examples of risk-based approaches 
include the drinking water safety plans and the adaptation reports produced by all companies 
in response to a Defra direction in 2011. All these approaches involve assessing risks and 
planning proactive interventions based on the nature of the risks assessed and the social and 
company risk appetite. 
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resilience is equated with ‘adapting’ (see for example UKCIP, 2010). 
Adaptation has been defined as “adjustment in natural or human systems in 
response to actual or expected climate stimuli or their effects which 
moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities” (Adger et al, 2007). This 
definition clearly shows why resilience is an important part of the picture. If a 
system is made more resilient to existing risks which are expected to 
increase, it should be expected to better cope with future climate change than 
otherwise. Alternatively, if a system is brittle now, it may be expected to fail 
more often if it faces increased stimuli in the future. Climate change is a “risk 
multiplier” (GOS, 2011) and hence in the context of climate change, a system 
which is resilient now might not necessarily be so in the future. It is important 
to bear this in mind when considering the historic information considered in 
phase 2 of the research. 
 
2.4. Legislative Context 
 
A brief exploration of the overall policy context is important in order to 
understand the research context. The basic responsibilities and expectations 
associated with the water service derive from the Water Industry Act 1991 (as 
amended). It is from this legislation and its accompanying statutory 
instruments that the basic definitions of satisfactory water service are derived. 
These legislative requirements cover the three aspects of service detailed in 
the research aims. Some of these standards are intended to be immutable 
(such as drinking water safety). The most recent piece of legislation related to 
service resilience is the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, the provisions of which 
are still being implemented. That Act effectively drove the working definition of 
resilience at the national policy level, defined key national responsibilities and 
created new powers designed to improve national resilience. The provisions 
of the act included powers and responsibilities for ‘category 2 responders’, 
which includes water companies. 
 
The most important thing to note for the purposes of this research is that the 
legislation does not set standards of protection, or standards of risk 
management which the water service is expected to meet. Indeed some 
subjectively defined exemptions exist in statutory instruments related to 
external hazards such as ‘severe weather’ (‘The GSS Regulations’, 2008). 
However there are statutory obligations which require water companies to 
ensure they have certain processes in place or meet certain requirements in 
emergency situations. The Security and Emergency Measures Direction is the 
most relevant of these (‘The SEMD Direction’, 1998). Under this the water 
companies are required to have independently certified plans in place to deal 
with any unavoidable failure of the piped water supply by providing a minimum 
supply of water by alternative means. The plans should include provision to 
maintain piped water supply as long as possible, by any means considered to 
be reasonable and practicable, for example by installing temporary links with 
neighbouring systems or at a pressure lower than normal with due regard to 
ensure that the water supply remains wholesome and fit for human 
consumption. The plans should aim at commencing the distribution of water 
by alternative means as soon as possible after the failure has occurred with a 
view to providing at least 10 litres of water per person per day to all those 
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affected within the first 24 hours and maintain this supply until the piped 
supply is restored. 
 
This is the absolute minimum baseline level of protection which companies 
strive to meet in emergency situations. But against this legislative background 
it is largely left to ad-hoc interpretation and agreement between the 
companies, customer bodies, regulators and government departments as to 
how resilient service should be in different times and places. 
 
2.5. Methods of assessing system resilience 
 
As explained earlier, resilience is related to both physical and socio-political 
characteristics and is driven by design, location, build, operation and 
maintenance (Coaffee and Bosher, 20084). This means it is impossible to 
understand resilience on a “product-by-product basis” – focusing on individual 
assets or groups of assets – as this will only give part of the picture; 
examination of the context of the system is required (Little, 2004). This makes 
resilience a very broad subject for study and perhaps as a consequence there 
are relatively few methods which have been applied for assessing system 
resilience. Those which exist tend to have been carried out with a low amount 
of detailed scrutiny. One reason for this is perhaps that it has only come into 
common use in the policy arena during the last decade (for example see a 
BBC article from March 2004) and as such the demand for reliable 
assessments of resilience have been limited. Much of the focus on improving 
resilience in Government and the water industry as an aim in and of itself was 
prompted by the Pitt Review of the 2007 floods which contained 92 
recommendations for action (Pitt review, 2008), all of which were accepted by 
Government. This catalyst prompted a significant amount of debate on the 
subject during the last water sector price review in 2009. A second possible 
reason for the limited number of applied examples may be that resilience is 
too broad a concept to be a feasible object of focussed research. The success 
or failure of this research should at least tell us something useful in answer to 
that question. Potential methods for testing resilience include process 
checklists, risk assessments (as explained above), event exercises, interviews 
and modelling; some examples are explored in this section. 
 
There have been very few academic studies of the overall resilience of water 
supply systems in the way defined here. There has been focus on the general 
resilience of urban environments (e.g. White, 2010 and Graham, 2009) often 
linking with wider sustainability considerations but these studies tend to focus 
on only the most material high-level risks and disasters facing cities and 
towns, although they do usually include both threats to water supply and 
quality and urban flooding risks. The approach taken in these examples is to 
review the available research and policy landscapes and discuss in general 
                                                 
4
 Coaffee and Bosher also make an interesting point that aesthetic design choices can often 
conflict with resilience (e.g. glass buildings can represent a significantly higher risk in the 
event of terrorist hazards) but in the water sector aesthetics is rarely a driving feature of 
modern asset design, underground or otherwise. 
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terms the relative importance of different high-level risks facing the urban 
system and the feasibility of potential solutions to these risks. Similar 
approaches have been taken by national and international bodies in studies 
on the resilience of water supply services in the face of climate change (e.g. 
WHO, 2009). 
 
There have been attempts to arrive at quantitative assessments of resilience. 
The work of Hashimoto et al. (1982) sought to develop indices related to how 
a system would recover from short-term supply shortages and is frequently 
cited as the first such attempt. Building on this model some researchers have 
developed resilience indices which in theory could be used to comparably 
assess resilience across time or between systems. Prasad and Park (2004) 
for example developed a network resilience index in an attempt to quantify 
what they called system reliability. In most cases these index approaches 
have been applied only to specific external hazards which might affect the 
system (such as flooding in the cases of Balica et al, 2009), or particular 
system attributes (such as pipe internal energy dissipation thresholds in the 
case of Todini, 2000). In these contexts the formulas required can be kept 
relatively simple. However taking this sort of approach is at odds with the 
definition of resilience derived above and given by Hollnagel et al. (2006), 
because it requires limited focus and therefore cannot represent the whole 
context of the system. 
 
Wang and Blackmore (2009) propose a systems analysis approach for water 
supply systems which derives quantitative results. However they were only 
able to provide an example of this method in use for a very limited water 
supply system – a single tank supplying a single property. Modelling 
approaches have also been attempted, for example Reca et al. built on the 
work of Todini (2000) to attempt to develop a model for assessing the 
reliability and cost implications of different water distribution network 
approaches (Reca et al, 2008). Like the index approaches, such modelling 
approaches have tended to confine themselves to small theoretical networks 
and have explored only a few network characteristics. They are therefore 
somewhat detached from reality and remain very difficult to apply to large 
complex networks. As such these methods are unlikely to be particularly 
useful for assessing resilience of water service on a national scale in line with 
the definition given above. 
 
Qualitative approaches based specifically on assessing processes have been 
used, for example Caralli et al. (2011) proposed a ‘Resilience management 
model’ which is focussed on process improvement. The point of this approach 
was to draw together a list of actions which can be done to increase resilience 
of a system and then use that list to assess where shortcomings in a 
particular system are and where improvements could be made. The focus in 
this approach is firmly on people, information, technology and facilities. 
Therefore these sorts of process approaches only offer part of the picture and 
tend to focus on the response and redundancy elements. Similar approaches 
have been trialled for assessing adaptation, such as that developed by Wilby 
and Vaughan (2011) and the NI188 indicator which was used to assess local 
government adaptation progress (Defra, 2008). Most recently the Cabinet 
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Office has given an explanation of the steps a company is expected to have 
been through in order to have understood and improved its resilience (Cabinet 
Office, 2011). However there are no applied examples in the literature where 
assessments against these notional best-practice approaches have been 
done. 
 
Probably the most comprehensive assessments which give a view on the 
resilience of service have been carried out by water companies themselves, 
rather than academic researchers. And it is therefore in work by these 
agencies where the most promising approaches to assessing resilience of the 
water service probably lie. For example, on drinking water quality the policy 
direction has placed a firm emphasis on comprehensive risk assessment and 
management encompassing “all steps in water supply from catchment to 
consumer” as the means of securing safe drinking water supplies (Bartram et 
al, 2009). The production and evaluation of drinking water safety plans is one 
approach to providing an assessment of the resilience of the system with 
regards to drinking water quality. 
 
Finally, a difficult and resource-intensive method of testing aspects of 
resilience which has also been applied is through exercises and drills. These 
are used frequently in the water sector to test responses to local risks (for 
example the potential escape of ozone at treatment works or the detection of 
cryptosporidium oocysts in the water supply) and have been used in recent 
years as a means of testing resilience to national risks. For example the 
Government’s ‘Watermark’ exercise, which took place in March 2011 was a 
simulation of a national flood event designed to test the command and 
communication protocols at the national level. The focus of such exercises is 
inevitably on the response component of resilience but it is a useful way of 
discovering potential problems and shortcomings of resilience and the 
components of a system which weaken the resilience of the whole 
(Environment Agency, 2011). 
 
2.6. Conclusions 
 
The most appropriate definition of resilience to use in this context is a 
measure of the ability of a system to perform its functions in the face of 
perturbations in its operating conditions such as environmental variability. This 
means that some risks which a water service faces, such as asset failure 
resulting from ‘wear and tear’, were not included. The definition used in this 
research was based predominantly on the current parlance in the sectors 
which were under investigation, where it has recently gained in prominence 
and it is clear that this has a solid (but not unanimous) basis in the academic 
literature. This definition has been used in order to avoid confusion in the 
research process and to produce conclusions which are intelligible for 
decision-makers in the sectors. 
 
Different methods for evaluating resilience in these terms have been explored 
in the academic literature but there is no single best-practice approach. 
Furthermore, an assessment of water service resilience has never been 
systematically attempted. There is also the fact that resilience will vary over 
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time and between regions due to the wide range of factors which determine 
how resilient a system is and the inherent nature of risks. As a consequence it 
is difficult to establish a consensus on whether the resilience of the water 
service in England and Wales needs to improve or not. Some useful 
approaches have been suggested in the literature but not been practically 
applied. In industry there had been progress, for example in the 2009 
business plans, but the coverage has been fragmented or covers only one or 
two hazards – e.g. fluvial and coastal flooding. Ideally there would be some 
middle way between detailed index-based or risk-assessment methods (which 
in practical terms can only explore one attribute or risk), and the high-level, 
low-detail assessments. The remainder of this research seeks to develop an 
example of such an approach which can be built on in the future. 
 
3. Analysis of data on service failures 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
A straightforward means of assessing current and historic resilience is to look 
at national and regional data on service disruptions. The reasoning behind this 
is that a resilient service should have fewer service disruptions over time than 
a brittle one. This approach is commonly used to assess the success of 
measures in the water sector and improvement over time, for example 
Bridgeman (2011) looked at drinking water quality compliance and 
performance against service indicators at an industry level and concluded that 
in most areas of service, key performance measures show a clear 
improvement trend. 
 
There are three main provisos to consider when using this approach. 
 Reliable and comparable information about service has only become 
available over the last twenty years as monitoring and reporting has 
improved. Given that some hazards (for example rainfall events 
exceeding the sewer design capacities) are estimated to occur with 
less than 0.5% probability in a year this period may be considered a 
small sample size. 
 Various accounting, political and reporting conventions, many of which 
have changed over time, may mask actual performance. For example, 
the method of reporting ‘low pressure’ events and the criteria under 
which fluctuations in a customers’ pressure service level may be 
excluded from publicly reported data have changed over time as 
discussed later in this section.  
 Data of this kind may not reflect the fact that external circumstances 
(and the associated nature of the risks) change over time – for example 
the data are unlikely to reveal resilience to risks under circumstances of 
future climate change. Therefore this approach can only demonstrate 
resilience to events which have a precedent. 
 
As explored in the literature review, resilience is highly likely to change over 
time as risk and vulnerability vary. Also many of the external hazards to which 
we might expect a water service to be resilient may be of a frequency less 
than the period for which data are available. Many of the possible hazards 
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have never materialised during the period. As such, this is an imperfect 
approach to measuring a present level of resilience. 
 
The analysis below focuses on the three key aspects of water service 
described in the introduction: supply interruptions, drinking water quality and 
pressure incidents. The information presented is drawn from water companies’ 
annual regulatory reporting submissions for the years 1990 to 2010. 
Information is provided both in data tables and in commentaries on specific 
points of data. 
 
3.2. Unplanned interruptions to supply 
 
Figure 2 shows the % of properties served in each water companies’ region 
experiencing supply interruption above 6 hours between 1990 (when this 
measure began to be consistently collected) and 2009. This data does not 
include legal supply restrictions (“hose pipe bans”) which are covered in 
section 3.3. As this data shows, almost every company has seen one or more 
years during the period where there have been significant increases in the 
number of customers experiencing supply interruptions. However the 
percentage of properties generally remains below 2% and only exceeds this 
on one occasion for one company. 
 
Figure 2 – Unplanned water service disruptions over 12 hours from 
1990-2009 as a % of each water company’s customers 
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The following table presents the most significant single events of service 
disruption identified in the data presented above. Table 1 describes events 
where water supplies were interrupted for more than 0.5% of a company’s 
water service customers for over 12 hours or more. 
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Table 1 – Significant supply interruptions since 1994 
Year (April 
to March) 
Water 
Company 
Cause Number of properties 
without supply and 
length of the period 
1994-95 Thames Water 
Low winter temperatures caused a 
high frequency of bursts. 4600 over 24 hours. 
 1995-96 
Welsh Water 
 
 
Thames Water 
Both companies cite severe winter 
temperature causing a high 
numbers of bursts. 
 
Thames Water also cite severe 
summer temperature highs in July 
95 caused more bursts. 
7000 properties over 24 
hours 
 
 
10000 properties over 24 
hours 
 1997-98 
Three Valleys 
Water 
Burst on a strategic 21 inch 
diameter main in Harlow, followed 
by two further bursts following the 
repair. 
3000 properties over 24 
hours; 
 
Over 12000 properties for 
more than 12 hours. 
2001-02 Severn Trent 
Strategic main burst interrupted 
supplies to around 15,500 
properties. 
10700 properties for over 
24 hours 
2001-02 
 
 
Anglian Water 
 
Bursts in Daventry causes as a 
result of scraping and relining 
mains previously when replacement 
would have been more advisable 
but more costly. 
 
 
2500 properties for over 24 
hours 
 2003-04 Thames Water 
Three major atypical events (trunk 
bursts) in London at Enfield Road, 
Brent Cross and Peckham adjacent 
to a storage reservoir. 
13000 properties for over 
24 hours 
 2004-05 
Northumbrian 
Water 
Flooding incident at Hexham - two 
strategic mains crossing a river 
catastrophically failed. (note that if 
only one had failed service would 
not have been affected). 
>6500 properties over 24 
hours 
 2005-06 
Three Valleys 
Water 
Severely hit by a single burst main 
incident, causing loss of supply. 
over 3000 properties for 
over 24 hours 
 2006-07 
Northumbrian 
Water 
Failure of 18” main at  
Middlesborough and Bedlington. 
>8000 properties for over 
24 hours 
 2007-08 Severn Trent 
Flooding of Mythe Treatment works 
during summer floods. 
130,000 properties for up 
to 17 days 
2011-12 Thames Water 
Burst main repair complicated by 
damaged nearby gas main. 
50,000 properties for 
unknown nr hours. 
Source: Analysis of annual regulatory return data and commentaries and queries to individual 
companies concerned. 
 
There were only 11 occasions in the 15 years from 1994 to 2009 where more 
than 0.5% of any company’s customers were without supply for more than 12 
hours at one time. The most frequent cause of such events is strategic mains 
failures. Explanations for failure of these include inadequate maintenance, 
severe winter weather and fluvial flooding. It is arguable that there is some 
inherent bias in the nature of the explanations in some of these cases. For 
example there existed little incentive for a company to write detailed 
explanations of any shortcomings in company procedures or responses which 
may have contributed to the nature of the service failure. This is due to the 
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fact that in this context the company was explaining its performance to a 
regulator in the context of defined regulatory outputs, which are enforceable 
by negative penalties on the company. Investigating these biases further and 
the nature of the political relationships driving this would be a useful area for 
further research. 
 
It is noteworthy that failures at non-infrastructure assets (treatment works, 
service reservoirs, pumping stations) have never caused significant disruption 
to supply (excluding quality failures), except in the case of the 2007 floods. 
 
Of the drivers for these events, only cold weather and flooding can be 
considered ‘external hazards’ as defined in section 2. These are discussed in 
more detail below. 
 
3.2.1. Cold weather 
 
A relationship between cold minimum temperatures and unplanned supply 
interruptions is shown in figure 2. 
 
Figure 3 – Minimum annual winter temperature shown with number of 
unplanned supply interruptions in England and Wales 1990-2010 
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Source: June Return Data and Met Office Publicly-available Weather Data  
 
The cold spell in 1995-96 affected two companies particularly badly. After that 
the effect of cold weather on interruptions to supply, even on occasions where 
situations were comparable to 95-96 such as 2008-09 and 2009-10, appears 
to be negligible. This indicates that cold weather per se is less of a significant 
driver of service failures than it has been in the past. The same is true of 
infrastructure asset performance. For example, figure 4 below shows number 
of air frost days (the number of days where the air temperature dropped below 
0 °C during the day) against bursts per 1000 km of mains. The two appear 
closely correlated, particularly at the points where winters were coldest, up 
until the start of the 21st century. From this point the level of bursts has 
stabilised, suggesting that the network (in terms of underground infrastructure 
assets) have become more resilient to cold weather than in the past. 
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Figure 4 – Air frost days and total mains bursts per 1000 km in England 
and Wales 1990 to 2010. 
Air Frost Days vs Mains bursts per km (IND)
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Source: June Return Data and Met Office Publicly-available Weather Data  
 
Given that the analysis above shows that pipes are bursting in response to 
cold weather, we also investigated whether they were still fracturing due to 
cold weather – but less obviously (i.e. the pipe was failing but not in as 
identifiable a failure mode) and if they were, whether these fractures were 
being addressed more quickly. This can be represented by leakage, as data 
on leakage is readily available. Figure 5 shows leakage levels against 
minimum temperature and demonstrates that there is little correlation between 
cold years and overall leakage levels. This is particularly obvious when we 
compare data for 2009-10, which included a very cold winter. Despite this, 
leakage levels remained stable. 
 
Figure 5 – Winter minimum temperatures shown against total leakage 
levels 
Winter minimum temperature vs Total Leakage (IND)
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These data suggest that companies are more resilient to cold weather than 
they were in the past. However, it may also suggest that other factors play a 
bigger role in driving the level of leaks and bursts than the cold weather. 
 
Having said this, as indicated above, the winters from 1998 to 2009 were all 
milder than the climate average (as measured from the 30-year period from 
1970 to 2000), so the occurrence of cold weather events which actually affect 
the assets to a significant extent has been lower in all these years. This 
analysis (based on the available weather data) also cannot directly indicate 
other environmental factors such as ground movement or rainfall which more 
directly influence levels of bursts and leaks. It is also likely that asset failure is 
more closely related to certain critical thresholds being exceeded (for example 
absolute minimum ground temperature below a certain threshold) rather than 
average air temperature over a month. This effect cannot be revealed from 
the high level data presented here. 
 
The high-level data suggests that companies have reduced their vulnerability 
to cold weather; either through improved assets or improved asset 
management, (for example specific winter contingency plans). There have 
been no major incidences in recent years where service has deteriorated 
outside the normal range (about 2SD from the mean) as a result of cold 
weather. 
 
It was possible to draw conclusions about the current resilience of the network 
to cold weather from the effect on service of the cold December in 2010. This 
was the December with the coldest average temperature of all Decembers 
since 1900 and the coldest single month since privatisation. It was also 
notable because temperature fluctuated to cause freeze-thaw events in a 
relatively short space of time of the type, which affect infrastructure networks 
in particular (Met Office, 2012). Information from the companies suggests that 
there was a large increase in the amount of contacts and repair activity during 
the 2010 Christmas period. In one region there was a 330% increase in burst 
mains and in another region the water being put into supply peaked at 600 
Ml/d (35%) higher than the average for that time of year5. This resulted in 
more than 50,000 properties suffering an unplanned interruption to supply 
lasting more than 12 hours compared with 15,000 in the previous year. 
However, in England and Wales there were no analogous events to the 
situation which arose in Northern Ireland during the same period, where the 
service impacts were much more significant, with 46,000 people being 
completely without water for over 12 hours at one time. Northern Ireland 
Water reported they were putting 40% more water into supply than normal6. 
Given the population differences between Northern Ireland and England and 
Wales, it is clear that the companies in England and Wales were more 
resilient to the weather event that occurred during that time than Northern 
Ireland. However it must be noted that the temperature average in Northern 
Ireland was 0.5°C colder than in England and Wales so the hazard was 
                                                 
5
 CC Water Regional Meetings 2011; Minutes available from 
http://www.ccwater.org.uk/server.php?show=nav.819 (accessed July 2012) 
6
 NI Water press notice (29 Dec ’10) 
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marginally more severe. An area for further work would be a more in-depth 
comparative analysis of the Northern Ireland water service failures. This would 
likely generate a number of useful conclusions about water service resilience 
and how it can be improved. This has not been covered in more detail here as 
the research focus was on England and Wales. 
 
3.2.2. Flooding 
 
Since privatisation, the most severe cases of service failure arose as a result 
of flooding. As shown in table 1 there was a significant water supply disruption 
for 130,000 customers for over 13 days. This was due to a number of extreme 
rainfall events following a period of consistently high rainfall in the summer 
months of 2007. This resulted in flooding of several critical water company 
assets, most notably the Mythe water treatment works.  
 
This event highlighted the vulnerability of large numbers of customers supply 
to disruption of large critical assets, particularly treatment works and hence a 
lack of resilience of these assets to extreme events. The consequences of 
that event have not been re-analysed in detail but this research considered 
the multiple learning points on network flexibility, flood defence and 
emergency planning which came out of the event and the following 
investigation (Severn Trent, 2007). The recommendations and features have 
been incorporated into the methodology explained in section 4. 
 
It has been identified that over 900 clean water pumping stations and water 
treatment works (>50% of those in England) are within EA flood risk areas, 
and the majority of these are assessed as being in “significant” flood risk 
regions (Environment Agency, 2009). This is because most water treatment 
works (and associated pumping assets) are sited near to a raw water 
resource (often the rivers identified as being the source of flood risk). Despite 
this, on a proportional basis it is a very small proportion of works which have 
been flooded. 
 
It should be noted that the more frequent cause of supply disruption resulting 
from flooding has been the impact on critical mains, rather than treatment 
works, such as the Hexham disruption in 2004-05 when flooding caused the 
failure of large trunk mains located at waterway crossing points. Although 
these events are more common, they usually result in disruption for fewer 
customers for a shorter period of time partly as they are more straightforward 
to rectify. 
 
More recently the abnormally high rainfall in April, June and July 2012 
(illustrated in figure 6) caused significant localised flooding. However there 
has been minimal impact on the water service across England and Wales, 
with most critical supply assets remaining operational. Although the severity 
and quantity of rainfall has been marginally less severe than in 2007, this 
suggests an increased level of resilience to flood risk. 
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Figure 6 – 2012 Monthly Rainfall anomalies for 2012 compared to 1971-
2000 climate average 
 
 (Met Office Data, Downloaded July 2012) 
 
3.3.  Supply restrictions and drought permits 
 
Water companies have legal powers to impose temporary water use 
restrictions as a means of controlling demand where there is a risk to supply. 
These are usually employed where dry weather threatens the balance of 
supply and demand. Similarly, drought permits which allow special measures 
such as abstraction beyond normal regulatory limits, can be granted to 
companies where the Environment Agency is convinced that the weather is 
unusually dry. The number and extent of such restrictions and permits is 
therefore a useful indication of how resilient the service is to periods of dry 
weather. The % of customers subject to any supply restrictions in each year is 
shown in figure 7. 
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Figure 7 – Number of customers in regions subject to hosepipe bans or 
drought orders from 1992-93 to 2009-10. 
 
Source: June Return Data 
 
As this graph shows, supply restrictions due to drought do occur periodically 
and are still necessary during periods of dry weather. In the 2011-12 year 
there were a number of supply restrictions in the South-East (data has not at 
this time not been published on number of customers affected). It is 
noteworthy that the number affected by the dry weather between 2004 to 
2007 (which drove the supply shortages in 2006-07) was lower than the 
number affected in the dry period 1995 to 1997, although this is partly 
reflected in the rainfall records which show a consistently drier three year 
period between 1995 and 1997 than was the case between 2003 and 2005. 
The rainfall records are shown in figure 8. 
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Figure 8 – Annual rainfall in England 
 
Source: Met Office 2012: http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/climate/uk/ 
 
We may conclude from this that the water service, particularly in the south 
east is not fully resilient to the effects of dry weather prolonged over a number 
of months, and particularly persistent multi-year dry periods. Supply 
restrictions are unpopular and draw negative press attention so whilst service 
is not affected per se, they would not be deployed unless the risks to service 
were high. Supply restriction events as highlighted above do not mean that 
water customers’ supply has been completely cut off or that pressure or 
drinking water quality decline. Drought permits and hosepipe bans can be 
seen as one measure within the water service which allows the reduction of 
service risk during dry periods. 
 
3.4. Pressure 
 
On pressure, the number of properties experiencing pressure below the 
‘reference level’ of flow of 9l/min at a pressure of 10m head on the customer's 
side of the main stop tap has declined every year. 
 
It is important to note that pressure at the property is often calculated using a 
surrogate measure and a factor (i.e. an accredited measurement of pressure 
is only taken at the mains not the tap). 
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Figure 9 – Number of properties receiving low pressure. 
Number of properties in England and Wales receiving low pressure under the DG2 measure
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Source: June Return Data 
 
This measure shows continual and steady improvement in the number of 
properties receiving low pressure. However the indicator used to track 
progress in the sector uses a number of “legitimate exclusions” which include 
the sorts of events to which companies might not be resilient. For example 
‘One-off incidents’ which covers a number of causes of low pressure are 
excluded- these can include mains bursts, failures of company equipment 
(such as PRVs or booster pumps), fire fighting; and ‘action by a third party’ 
(Ofwat, 2009). Low pressure caused by maintenance can also be a legitimate 
reason for excluding from this measure. 
 
The aim of these exclusions is really to focus efforts on what can be controlled 
without creating a perverse incentive to companies to deal with problems over 
which they have little control (such as customers’ own pipework). However the 
effect of them is to mask the effect of failures of resilience in the reported 
statistics. Therefore we can conclude that this measure is not an ideal 
measure of historic pressure resilience. Figure 10 shows numbers of 
properties experiencing low pressure including those as a result of ‘allowable’ 
exclusions. 
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Figure 10 – Number of properties receiving pressure below the expected 
standard. 
Number of properties in England and Wales receiving low pressure including "allowable 
exclusions"
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Source: June Return Data 
 
Under this measure pressure failures have actually significantly increased 
over time, which suggests that companies have become less resilient. 
However, the research suggested that this was due to companies installing 
better monitoring equipment on their networks and picking up pressure 
fluctuations which previously went unrecorded. This is therefore not a 
comparable measure over time as an indicator of resilience. Another measure 
which could be used is the number of customer complaints driven by low 
pressure incidents, which would be a worthwhile area for further analysis. 
 
3.5. Quality 
 
Failures of drinking water quality are relatively rare and have been 
significantly reducing over time as can be seen by the quality regulation 
compliance performance over time (figure11). 
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Figure 11 - Percentage of tests failing to meet quality standards from 
1991 to 2010 
 
Source: DWI Annual Report 2010 (June 2011) 
 
This strongly suggests increasing resilience on drinking water quality 
especially given the fact that standards for drinking water have been 
consistently rising over the last twenty years. 
 
In cases where the Drinking Water Inspectorate believes the company is at 
fault under the Water Supply (Water Quality) Regulations, it has powers to 
take action. The number of occasions where it does take successful legal 
action may be used as one proxy measure for a company’s business as usual 
and response and recovery processes. Successful prosecutions are shown in 
Table 2. 
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Table 2 - DWI successful prosecutions and fined amounts (actual prices) 
Incident year Successful prosecutions Amount 
1991  0  - 
1992  0  - 
1993 1 £1,000 
1994 2 £125,000 
1995 2 £9,500 
1996 2 £15,000 
1997 16 £164,500 
1998 9 £130,500 
1999 1 £15,000 
2000 2 £33,000 
2001  0  - 
2002 1 £3,750 
2003  0  - 
2004 3 £65,000 
2005  0  - 
2006 3 £92,000 
2007  0  - 
2008 1 £7,500 
2009  0  - 
2010  0  - 
TOTAL 43 661750 
Source: DWI data available at: http://dwi.defra.gov.uk/about/annual-report/2010/index.htm 
 
The trend to fewer prosecutions in recent years suggests that companies are 
becoming more resilient to risks causing quality failures. However it could be 
a result of other factors, e.g. reduced regulatory effectiveness, legal issues or 
issues going undetected. 
 
Where quality failures do occur they are often the result of asset failure 
(usually burst mains) or inadequate monitoring and sampling. Operator error 
is a cause in some cases, most notably the Camelford incident in 1988 which 
highlights the importance of operating procedures and training in ensuring the 
system and service are resilient. The most common causes which can be 
classed as external hazards are upstream contamination, most frequently 
either cryptosporidium or pesticides and weather impacts on raw water quality 
(For example weather was cited 3 times as a contributing factor in the issues 
highlighted by the DWI in 2010). Another external hazard which has caused 
quality issues is power supply failure, due to network distribution failures or 
even from lightning strikes. In all these cases a resilient treatment process 
and supply network would be expected to cope with the change in external 
circumstances and deliver potable water. 
 
3.6. Conclusions 
 
Taking all these measures together gives us an impression of the overall level 
of resilience in the water service of England and Wales. The data suggest 
overall improvement in service resilience – particularly on quality and 
constancy of supply – over the past couple of decades. Against this context it 
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would be difficult to argue that the service is not resilient in current 
circumstances without evidence that there will be in the future some 
significant change in the nature of the risks borne by the service or a decline 
in the resilience of the service. A study of the data in this way does not enable 
us to make conclusions about these two things because it is a retrospective 
analysis. The data here only indicates overall performance, affected by a 
range of different factors and not the ‘resilience’ attribute of the system. It is 
therefore a useful and necessary context in answering questions about the 
level of resilience but it doesn’t fully answer the question. The second 
informative element it was possible to take from this analysis are the clues 
about the types of external hazards which are most common and how the 
existing systems have generally responded to those hazards in the past. 
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4. Evaluating resilience through process assessment criteria 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Companies, regulators and stakeholder groups in the water sector have 
recognised that ‘resilience’ is a desired outcome for the water service (Ofwat, 
2010). There have been attempts in the sector, most notably by the regulator 
at the 2009 price review, to arrive at a means of gauging companies' progress 
at meeting such outcomes which are not readily measurable by any 
consistently used approach (unlike, for example, leakage performance). 
Therefore a need was identified to arrive at a method by which resilience of a 
water system can be gauged which also might identify elements requiring 
improvement or additional resource. 
 
The research into past service standards and what makes a water service 
resilient enabled the generation of a list of expectations on features one might 
expect to see as part of a resilient water service. One institution which has 
responsibility for delivering water supply within a region of England and Wales 
was then assessed against these criteria. The core principles behind a 
resilient service and the details of the approach taken to evaluating against 
these criteria are explained in section 4.2. The results from applying this 
approach are described in section 4.3 and conclusions from this phase of the 
research are discussed in section 4.4. 
 
4.2. Approach to evaluating resilience 
 
Approaches which seek to measure the quality of a service where a 
quantitative evaluation is difficult or impossible have been used in the water 
industry in England and Wales. Such an approach involves establishing 
guidance or principles and then qualitatively assessing the success of a 
system or organisation in meeting those principles, usually based on a report 
or plan and questioning and answering processes. Regulators use such 
approaches where there is limited information available and where there is 
inherent uncertainty, for example assessing preparedness to future climate 
change. Examples include Ofwat’s approach to assessing capital 
maintenance planning through an asset management assessment scoring 
system (Ofwat, 2009) and Government’s approach to assessing ‘adaptation’ 
to climate change (Rance et al, 2012). Advantages of the qualitative approach 
include fewer requirements for data, less need for certainty about the future 
and low administrative burden. The biggest disadvantages are the high 
degree of uncertainty and subjectivity associated with the assessments and 
the perennial problems associated with attempting to measure actual 
performance and behaviour from stated processes and frameworks. 
 
Some attempts at taking this approach for resilience in particular have been 
attempted recently. For example a questionnaire was provided to water 
companies early in 2012 by Mott Macdonald and the responses were 
analysed as part of their work to produce a report for Ofwat on principles for 
resilience planning (Mott Macdonald, 2012). This exercise provided a useful 
initial indication of some of the key tools and approaches used by companies 
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and allowed conclusions on areas of potential weakness. It is therefore a 
useful starting point. However it does not give a clear picture of the level of 
resilience of the service in any particular system.  
 
The method used in this research was similar. First a set of principles of 
resilience were explored, i.e. attributes and features of a resilient system. The 
principles arrived upon are described in section 4.2.1. The features of one 
geographic water supply system were then examined, using evidence from 
public documents and strategic business plans, internal processes and 
procedures and discussions with staff. There was no formal interview 
approach using a set of defined questions, although this would be one way to 
improve this element of the approach. In simple terms the process was to 
establish a list of the things that could be done to improve the resilience of a 
water system and then check whether these things are done. From this the 
intention was to enable an assessor to draw conclusions about how resilient a 
particular system is. The system under examination has been kept 
anonymous in this research because some of the information was deemed 
commercially sensitive. The study was intended to serve as an example of 
how this method could be applied to assess comparative resilience of different 
water systems and provoke ideas about how such a method could be applied 
and improved, rather than as an assessment of that particular system. 
 
4.2.1. Principles of resilience 
 
The purpose of establishing core principles of resilience was to enable some 
measurement of forward-looking resilience of a system, even if this was just in 
a binary way. The logic was that if these features are in evidence then the 
system is likely to be more resilient than one which does not have those 
features in evidence. This reasoning is similar to that employed with regards 
to capital maintenance planning. In the water sector the capital maintenance 
planning common framework is used as a basic set of principles and features 
which an optimal capital maintenance planning process should be able to 
evidence. The chances of making errors in risk assessment, project planning 
and capital delivery are judged to be lower if these features are in evidence. 
The common framework is fundamentally concerned with risk, primarily risks 
around asset deterioration and failure, and therefore this research sought to 
develop and apply a similar framework for ‘resilience’ planning which might 
overlap with an assessment of success against the common framework. 
 
Outcomes from the literature review, from relevant government and regulatory 
guidance documents - for example PPS25 (DCLG, 2010) and Government 
guidance for category 1 and 2 responders (Cabinet Office, 2009) - and from a 
review of companies business plans, strategies and best practice guides were 
used to generate a long list of features and activities which are expected to be 
present in a resilient water supply system. The features and activities which 
were reached in the long list develop the general categories of resilience put 
forward by the Cabinet Office and were intended to be more relevant for the 
water service in particular. The long list of features which are expected in a 
resilient water system is shown in Table3. 
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Table 3 - Long list of features and activities you would expect to see in a 
resilient institution. 
 
Category Feature Explanation
A clear overarching strategy for service with 
concise, clear messages. 
Important so staff and stakeholders (particularly contractors) understand the companies' priorities and to help justify 
business decisions directly in relation to service.
Clear definitions and prioritisation
In resource-constrained world it is important that priorities are made clear so that resources are allocated in a 
proportionate way.
Relevant key performance indicators
Provide the internal incentives to safeguard service and prompts the management pressure to reduce risks and react 
efficiently to issues. These should be closely and simply linked to states service priorities.
Overall approach – a ‘corporate resilience 
strategy’ 
Provides mandate to reduce risks and plan for failures. Without this mandate risks can go ignored and processes are 
not necessarily in place to cope with issues arising.
Tolerances - what sorts of things the company is 
willing to accept and what are unacceptable.
Provides clarity which is important for risk management and resource allocation. If certain failures are tacitly agreed to 
be tolerable then this can lead to risks going unaddressed.
Governance: Clear responsibilities for staff and 
others
Diffuse responsibility can lead to inertia ("not my job") or over-reliance on good will which can be unreliable. Clear 
responsibilities also themselves prompt action to understand and address risks in areas of responsibility.
Appropriate (positive) incentives and penalties
True both internally and externally (e.g. Vandalism can cause significant service problems and the risk of censure is 
important).
Clarity throughout organisation Without clarity on service priorities responses to external hazards can be mixed or slower than otherwise. This is also 
true of clear responsibilities as diffused responsibilities can lead to ineffective action
Staff can communicate with each other It is important that actions can be completed quickly, and this occurs more readily in a system where communication is 
clear, easy and efficient. Communication is important where a hazard arises so that action can be coordinated.
Understanding of network and particularly where 
critical failure points are located
Allows a better identification and understanding of risks beforehand and a better diagnosis of problems when issues 
occur. This increases likelihood of resolving system problems to eliminate or reduce service failures.
An integrated understanding of the network (not 
just isolated parts of the network).
It is possible to have a good understanding of the network but have this understanding diffused or split between areas. A 
wider understanding can help enable quicker resource shifting or enable more efficient solutions than would be possible 
using only a local approach.
Good asset knowledge, reliable data (including of 
elements of the network out of control 
Important in reliably identifying and assessing risks to service and will allow more targeted solutions if issues arise. This 
also increases the likelihood of optimised maintenance which reduces risks to service. An example would be 
understanding the condition and material of pipes further down the network and how they might be affected by a quality 
failure upstream at the works.
Good forecasting of deterioration and risk. Allows risks to be better prioritised and maintenance to be planned in a such a way as to reduce risks to service.
Linked into weather forecasting services.
Allows earlier warning of external hazards and therefore increases the likelihood of pre-emptive action or timely remedial 
action.
Linked into flood forecasting centre (available to 
national category 2 responders which includes 
water companies).
A specific example of the above - the flood forecasting centre can provide alerts to water companies at different risk 
levels days in advance and thus increase alertness allowing pre-emptive action or planning to reduce the time-scales of 
remedial action.
Strategic and Regional Flood Risk Assessments 
analysed in relation to network
Allows companies to reliably identify  and focus on areas of flood risk and hence plan work to minimise the risks or set 
in place specific processes to deal with the flood risks in that area.
Good hydrological understanding of the network 
and its consequent service time thresholds (e.g. 
How long a particular service reservoir can supply 
a population before reaching low levels leading to 
service issues)
It is possible to have a good understanding network failure modes without understanding impacts on service, this is an 
additional set of knowledge needed across a range of groups to provide service resilience.
Monitoring and alerts.
A system providing reliable early warnings of asset deterioration, asset failure, raw quality fluctuations or supply 
constraints all allow earlier action and therefore can help reduce risk of service failure. These systems are more efficient 
when part of an efficient telemetry network but they need not necessarily all be automatic, they can take the form of site 
checks or iterative surveys. Indeed periodic validation of monitoring equipment is a requirement of reliable 
understanding.
Systems which react to alerts Systems are needed which pick up alerts and notify the right person, otherwise they can go unnoticed.
Reliable quality monitoring – e.g. on pH which can 
provide timely alerts.
A particular subset of the above it is important that water quality monitoring takes place to allow pre-emptive action on 
quality. Monitoring failures can lead to service issues downstream and may even necessitate supply restrictions.
Network maps and knowledge available to 
relevant staff. (& up to date).
Linked to good asset knowledge, time can be wasted, and service risk multiplied where assets are unable to be 
geographically located by staff or contractors. Conversely risk can be reduced if locations are known and 
communicated.
Recognition of interdependencies with other 
organisations
External hazards might not necessarily affect the water system directly but might cause knock-on effects on a system 
on which the water system depends. There are risk reduction measures and contingency processes which can be 
deployed to mitigate risks arising in this way.
Understand reliability of energy supplies A key example of a universal interdependency risk, water supply systems rely inherently on energy. It is therefore 
sensible to understand the resilience of the energy supply system and put in place risk mitigants and procedures 
should it fail. A key example is backup generation.
Contract provisions for calling on outsourced 
suppliers where necessary.
Some supplies and tasks are obtained from outside the water supply system, therefore a resilient system should 
prepare processes to call on outsourced suppliers at short notice where necessary, and include emergency provisions 
in contract arrangements if possible. This increases the chance of timely responses to arising issues.
Engage with the regulators.
In the water sector regulators exercises a significant amount of control over water systems by setting price limits and 
regulatory targets. These are key factors determining available resources for companies. Where additional resources or 
certain service risks exist these should be discussed with regulators so that targets and price limits help balance risk 
rather than exacerbate it.
Good relationships with external agencies and 
effective communication channels
When external risks materialise having good relationships and established communications channels with associated 
organisations can make it easier to enact mitigating action. Reciprocal aid arrangements can reduce the overall risk to 
the water system at minimal additional resource cost over the lifetime of the arrangement.
Plan with others Emergency planning is more likely to work when applied if it has been considered jointly with other organisations who 
may be involved. This increases the chance that snags can be addressed beforehand and thus enables more effective 
responses.
Lobby effectively for others to reduce risk where 
there are reliances.
Many risks to a system are not within the control of the system controllers. However it is still possible to increase your 
own resilience by seeking to influence others who do control external risks to reduce those risks themselves. It is good 
practice to be sharing these sorts of risks where apparent
Identify risks to service
It is important that all the possible risks to service are considered at various points in a system. If some risks go 
unidentified this decreases the likelihood of them being effectively pre-emptively addressed or planned for. To remain 
valid this exercise should be iterative so that new risks are identified and considered.
Consider external hazards which are infrequent Risks which are infrequent, or indeed have never historically occurred can often be ignored. However it is good practice 
to identify risks which are feasible, even if infrequent and if this is not done the system is less likely to be resilient.
Consider super-extreme risks - even though they 
are unlikely it is useful to consider them - are 
unexpected occurrences and can test systems.
Some risks are extremely remote, for example plane crashes into assets or earthquake disruption. However the cost of 
considering these risks momentarily is usually very low and whilst it might not be cost beneficial to address them, 
considering these sorts of risks can offer new perspectives on existing risks and processes. Considering extreme risks 
is also a good way to check the validity of contingency planning.
Risk screening at a high level
Where risks are being identified in a resilient system there should be evidence that these risks are screened using 
some set of criteria so that they can be assessed and categorised depending on their nature.
Risk assessment at company/business level
Risk screening itself will lead to a less tailored approach to risks and therefore it increases the chance of effective risk 
responses if the risks are assessed in more detail individually at business level.
Risk assessment at asset level
Meaningful understanding of risks leading to effective responses is more likely at levels at which quantification and 
direct response are possible. Therefore the most resilient systems are expected to evidence understanding at granular 
levels of the system. This should be in evidence across the system and be related to the business-level understanding 
of risk.
Risk management A resilient system should have a process to follow through from risk assessment to risk responses.
Iterative assessment If risks are assessed as only a one-off exercise then it is likely the assessment will become less valid over time. It is 
therefore important that assessment is iterative. This also increases the chance that risks and processes will be front of 
mind.
Risks shared A system will not be resilient if a comprehensive risk assessment has been carried out but not communicated to those 
able to effect action. Therefore it is good resilience practice for risk assessments (or elements of them) to be shared 
with key agents in the organisation managing the system.
Strategy & Governance
Information and Data
Collaboration
Risk
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Category Feature Explanation
Addressing risk where it exists Evidence that where risks are highlighted as potentially affecting service that there are processes by which changes to the 
system can be affected to reduce those risk.
Propose and carry out resilience improvements
Where risks to service exist, there should be evidence that the system is capable or working up practical risk reduction 
solutions which are then taken forward.
Protected works.
A specific example of  resilience improvements particularly relevant to the water industry, where threats to particular water 
treatment works and/or pumping stations have been judged to present risks to service, a resilient system should be able to 
organise itself to protect those works.
Restricted access and security
It is important that malicious agents are kept out of critical areas to reduce risks. Whilst this has not caused significant 
disruption in the past the research found examples where metal theft and vandalism had caused asset disruption with 
consequent risks to service.
Make and follow drinking water safety plans.
Plans for reducing all drinking water safety risks should be in place and there should be evidence that these are being 
followed. Companies are legally obliged to have drinking water safety plans so you would expect these plans to be in 
evidence.
Addressing interdependencies Relating to external risks, there should be evidence that engagement or intervention activity has taken place to minimise the 
shared risks.
Solutions addressing multiple problems A system is more likely to be resilient where there is evidence that solutions address multiple risks at once. This is likely to 
be more efficient and this feature would also suggest a better understanding of risks and the network.
Quantifying differences made before and after 
interventions
If there is evidence of understanding of the difference which interventions have made to the risks to service, this puts 
organisations in a better position to reassess risks and take further action if necessary. If this is not possible the system 
may be subject to unforeseen risks and therefore be less resilient.
Responsive maintenance procedures (fix-on-fail)
A resilient water system will at least have proven fix-on-fail asset maintenance procedures with the aim of repairing assets 
before service is impacted. Evidence of this would be a minimum requirement of a resilient water system.
Asset condition investigations
A resilient system should either evidence reliable asset knowledge or, where this does not exist, there should be rolling 
asset condition investigations so that risks can be spotted and addressed before they occur. This should inform proactive 
maintenance regimes and/or influence the provisions made for reactive maintenance.
Proactive maintenance regimes. – service reservoirs, 
distribution, disinfection and treatment process control.
A resilient system should have proactive maintenance regimes with the aim of keeping the system perpetually in good 
working order by tackling assets before they fail and thus reducing risks to service. This includes replacement and repair 
activity but also general maintenance e.g. re-greasing, pipe cleaning, periodic disinfection.
Provisions for maintenance in different conditions
For example cold weather, the resilience of a system can be expected to decrease if the maintenance planned and reactive 
can only occur in benign conditions. Risks to the maintenance regime can place risks on the service.
Adequate equipment checks. Business as usual in a resilient system should include consistent checks on equipment and service levels 
Stringent maintenance and operation procedures
As part of business as usual it is important that there are stringent operational procedures backed up by training and 
checking. This is important in minimising operator error and thus introducing risks to the system and to service.
Procedures for emergencies – including extant manuals.
A n effective response to emerging risks relies on there being well-understood procedures for who should do what and when. 
These should be flexible enough to be applied in a range of circumstances but clear enough to avoid confusion in the 
response.
Procedures tested through exercises
The procedures for emergencies are more likely to function correctly if and when they are needed if they have been tested 
with staff through exercises. This is an effective way to learn from and address potential snags in the procedure and hence 
improve the effectiveness of responses
Backup capacity (personnel)
In order to react quickly and effectively it is important that the right resources are accessible and that there is provision for 
overtime working or secondment if necessary.
Backup capacity (equipment and resources)
Certain equipment and resources may be needed to restore system service and it is important that these are accessible by 
prior arrangement, potentially with external parties for use in special circumstances.
Plans specific to possible events
Whilst generic emergency procedures are better than no plan and make it easier to communicate, a more resilient system 
should have prepared plans particular to the different risks which it has identified in its risk assessment based on 
understanding of the system and how it might be expected to react.
Communication protocols
In the event of service issues arising it is important that there are good communication protocols in place as part of the 
procedure to minimise confusion and ensure the correct methods are communicated externally. This includes clear chains of 
command with directions to staff made clear.
Clear routes to notify others where there’s a public health 
risk for example (PCT, DWI)
In certain failure events there are specific communications which are crucial to preserving the system. A resilient system 
should have communication routes for these sorts of priority communications planned out and resources in advance of any 
emergency occurring.
Flexibility in the system.
The most effective responses to risks in a water system will involve reorganising the system operation so that service is not 
affected. This is dependent on the arrangements made in the system and the flexibility in operational possibilities. 
Procedures and processes for rearrangement along these lines are a feature of resilient systems.
Spares.
Stocks or rapid access to spare parts can drastically reduce the time needed for repairs, and indeed maintenance, and can 
therefore reduce down time and risks to service.
Backups (e.g. generators).
A resilient system should have backup supplies (i.e. Alternative sourcing routes and headroom in quantity) for crucial system 
inputs, for example electricity, diesel and treatment chemicals like ferric sulphate.
Staff who care about the service and reputation of the 
business
The motivations of staff operating a system are important in determining how resilient it is. Where the staff are keen and 
focussed on service objectives under all circumstances the system is likely to be more resilient than where staff are 
unconcerned with service outcomes. Motivation is also a key determinant of speed in response to materialising risks.
Flexible working to cope
A system is more likely to be resilient where the staff are willing to work at inconvenient times or for additional time in order 
to deal with risks arising.
Pro activity - looking for risks 
Risk identification and assessment is most likely to reflect reality and identify all feasible risks where it involves a wide range 
of people working across the system. Therefore a resilient  system is more likely to result when risks are being flagged at 
every level and assessed and managed seriously.
Honesty (e.g. About failures - escalating to the right level).
Honesty and transparency is also important so that risks are identified at the earliest possibility. In some circumstances 
where risks or issues are not communicated to staff working across a system this can cause threats to service which 
otherwise could have been address earlier.
Good diagnostic procedure. Procedures for identifying problems and snags are important in aiding corporate learning following service failures.
Logs during incidents
It is good practice when service risks arise to track progress and issues which occur along the way. This allows good 
practice to be incorporates into future processes and procedures and allows problems and avoidable issues to be identified.
Meaningful lessons learned and procedures changed
A method of improving resilience is to carry out meaningful analysis of service failures and consider improvements and 
changes to the system which would reduce risks to service.
Incorporate changes in industry best practice
Adopting new technologies and processes which help improve the features outlines above is a way to improve system 
resilience over time.
Assurance (process audit?)
Process and procedures can be subject to external scrutiny and offer recommendations and improvements for how they can 
be improved.
Response and recovery
Cultural
Good practice
Interventions
Maintenance (BAU): 
N.B. Since this is not a 
maintenance focussed 
method this covers the 
main elements you 
would expect from a 
maintenance regime 
relevant to the resilience 
of the system. As noted 
in section 2, the 
resilience of a system 
over time is deeply 
related to the 
effectiveness of the 
maintenance regime in 
place.
 
 
A simple scoring method was used against each of these features. The 
number of scoring options was kept to a minimum in an attempt to reduce 
subjectivity in the analysis. The possible scores are given in Table 4. 
 
34 
 
Table 4 – Simple scoring approach used against criteria. 
Code Description Explanation Example 
4 Strongly evident Multiple strong sources 
evidence the fact that this 
feature exists throughout the 
system. No conflicting 
sources to dispute this. 
An up to-date process 
document covering the 
feature, numerical 
evidence in a business 
plan that it has been 
followed confidence from 
people that it is followed. 
3 In evidence Some evidence that this 
feature exists only in parts of 
the system or only a limited 
number of evidence sources 
available. 
A business plan shows 
some risk assessments 
have been carried out 
and actions planned but 
some key areas are 
absent. 
2 Partially evident Some conflicting evidence – 
for example suggesting 
evident only in some parts of 
the system but not others or 
weakly embedded. 
A process document 
exists but relevant 
members of staff have 
never heard of it. 
1 No evidence No reliable evidence that the 
feature is in evidence in the 
system. There may be 
evidence that it is not in 
evidence. 
No process in evidence 
and no mention of the 
feature in documents or 
by staff. 
 
It is worth noting that this approach might only indicate where further analysis 
is required not necessarily whether the feature is entirely absent. This is 
something to be aware of but does not diminish the approach as a way of 
identifying areas for further investigation and possible improvement. 
 
4.3. Application of the approach 
 
The following sections describe high-level findings from the investigation 
grouped under the categories alongside the scores we arrived at under each 
feature. Overall results are discussed in section 4.4. The commentary under 
each section does not give a full explanation of how each score was derived 
but merely highlights key examples and findings from the assessment and 
discusses the type of evidence which was found for each of the features. 
 
4.3.1. Strategy & Governance 
 
The water system we investigated showed strong evidence of clear strategies 
and priorities for service. The three key service criteria of pressure, supply 
and quality are all prioritised in company strategy documents and 
communicated strongly through the business. It was also found that these 
high level service objectives were strongly linked to individual performance 
reviews. These were themed around the ideas of “always on” and “good to 
drink”. Tolerances around these objectives were also made clear externally 
and internally and there were company key performance indicators, with 
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monthly minimum and stretch targets, specifically on these aspects of service. 
These also tied very strongly to monetary incentives at all levels of the 
company. What was less clear from the research was whether there was a 
corporate resilience strategy, i.e. a long-term objective for the levels of risk 
borne by customers. Whilst this was arguably implicit in the overall strategy 
and performance monitoring, it was not clear that these standards were 
expected to be maintained ten or twenty years into the future. Thus in areas of 
the business focussed entirely on long-term objectives, for example strategic 
business planning, it was less clear the tolerances and service levels which 
were being aimed for. 
 
Feature Score 
A clear overarching strategy for service with concise, clear messages.  4 
Clear definitions and prioritisation 4 
Relevant key performance indicators 4 
Overall approach – a ‘corporate resilience strategy’  2 
Tolerances - what sorts of things the company is willing to accept and 
what are unacceptable. 3 
Governance: Clear responsibilities for staff and others 3 
Appropriate (positive) incentives and penalties 4 
Clarity throughout organisation 3 
 
4.3.2. Information and data 
 
An important component of resilience is having the right information and data 
to understand risks, understand issues which materialise in the network and, 
most importantly from a service perspective, to be able to prioritise solutions 
which protect or restore service in a timely manner. This means an 
understanding of the geographic network and local contexts, of external 
hazards such as flood risk and of the delivery of solutions, e.g. the process by 
which a mains burst repair is procured. It is particularly important that a 
company understands critical failure points, where service will be disrupted as 
a result of one point of failure (for example a trunk main). The speed of 
acquiring information and data is also important. 
 
The research in this area suggested that water systems in England and Wales 
now deploy a wide range of information systems for storing and distributing 
information and data about their network and its performance. Many of these 
technologies have been adopted widely only within the last ten years with 
some only becoming embedded in business as usual practice within the last 
five. Examples include company-wide, live GIS systems and dynamic 
scheduling systems accessible to multiple parties across the organisation. 
However it is also clear that these systems do not increase resilience on their 
own – as they rely on people having the correct levels of understanding and 
using them effectively to assess risks and plan risk-reduction interventions or 
respond to issues as they arise. For example a replacement might be made 
which is different to that in the original plan (a MDPE pipe as opposed to a 
cast iron pipe). This might go unreported and result in the system being out of 
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date. Companies recognise this as an issue and seek to establish processes 
for capturing updates and status changes on systems. 
 
Figure 12 - Example of GIS system showing mains water supply system. 
 
 
It was also clear that there was good understanding of the network and critical 
failure points in control centres and operating staff and that this knowledge 
was being constantly updated and disseminated to operators across the 
system. However there were fewer early warning systems and links to 
weather forecasting services and flood warnings than could have been 
possible. Some parts of the organisation were linked in to these warnings but 
there were not necessarily clear processes for communicating these warnings 
across the system. It was also found that there were sometimes delays or 
hindrances to staff communicating with each other and periodic system 
failures had historically caused problems with monitoring and alert systems in 
the past leading to service risks.  
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Feature Score 
Staff can communicate with each other  3 
Understanding of network and particularly where critical failure points 
are located 4 
An integrated understanding of the network over the whole geographic 
region of responsibility and an understanding of the networks in other 
neighbouring geographical areas (not just isolated parts of the network). 4 
Good asset knowledge, reliable data (including of elements of the 
network out of control  4 
Good forecasting of deterioration and risk. 2 
Linked into weather forecasting services. 2 
Linked into flood forecasting centre (available to national category 2 
responders which includes water companies). 2 
Strategic and Regional Flood Risk Assessments analysed in relation to 
network 2 
Good hydrological understanding of the network and its consequent 
service time thresholds (e.g. How long a particular service reservoir can 
supply a population before reaching low levels leading to service issues) 4 
Monitoring and alerts. 3 
Systems which react to alerts 2 
Reliable water quality monitoring  3 
Network maps and knowledge available to relevant staff. (& up to date). 4 
 
4.3.3. Collaboration 
 
There is strong consensus in the literature and government guidance that a 
key feature of a resilient institution is one which recognises interdependencies 
with other systems and takes steps to reduce the risks to itself from those 
interdependencies (see for example Ofwat, 2010). Government guidance 
exists which details the types of steps category 1 and 2 responders are 
expected to go through with other agencies (Cabinet Office, 2009) and has 
initiated and supported a number of fora through which to do this, for example 
local resilience fora. Minimum expectations on collaborative resilience 
therefore centre around engagement with these mechanisms. A company 
operating a resilient water system should be expected to be considering 
where other bodies might be affected by external hazards and hence where 
this might affect the system. The research found that the system under 
investigation was an active member of several resilience groups whose 
purposes were to identify and discuss interdependencies and collaborate on 
emergency planning. Some stakeholders also expressed a view that water 
companies in England and Wales were leading other utility organisations in 
this area. Similarly there was strong evidence that water companies were 
engaging with regulators and local and national Government on resilience, 
including responding to consultations on the subject and communicating 
about risk and resilience schemes at local levels. However it was not clear 
that the whole system was aware of these groups or that their discussions 
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and outputs were being used to effect system changes either within or outside 
the water system.  
 
It is important that a resilient organisation understands its role in different 
incidents involving other parties, including ones where government is 
involved, such as wide-scale flooding. Evidence of this was found in multi-
agency procedures and guidance documents but there was no strong 
evidence that all parties involved in an incident would be familiar with these 
procedures and it is likely that application of them would therefore be more 
ad-hoc than would be ideal. Procedures like this do give clarity where 
disputes or points of disagreement on responsibility may arise. 
 
It was clear that water companies do share information about their network 
with relevant stakeholders, for example the Highways Authority and local 
councils. In some cases this information is live – for example a system 
accessed through an internet browser showing the water network, scheduled 
maintenance operations and supply disruptions. There were also found to be 
strong links between developers and water companies with the aim of 
ensuring the water network is not damaged or risks increased by accidental 
external interference or development changes which could affect service in 
parts of the network. Information and guidance was being shared to try and 
prevent this. 
Potentially the most important area for collaboration in the water industry in 
England and Wales was found to be between water companies, who are 
ultimately responsible for delivering the service, and the large number and 
variety of companies to whom various critical functions in delivering the 
service are delegated, for example construction firms and leakage repair sub-
contractors. The research highlighted that the trend in the water industry since 
privatisation has been for increased levels of activity carried out by 
outsourced companies, and over the past two years, there has been a trend 
towards a smaller number of bigger sub-contracts. 
 
This means that the relationship between water companies and contractors is 
an important determinand in resilience of the system and it also means that to 
truly assess the resilience of the water service would require assessments of 
the resilience of the various suppliers on whom the water companies rely to 
deliver the service over a period of time. This is more difficult than carrying out 
a study of the public water companies because private contractors are – with 
the exception of health and safety – only very rarely required to publish 
information about their business planning, contingency planning and risk 
profiles, particularly in relation to their operations in certain geographic regions 
and for certain clients. This is a critical area for further investigation, as it may 
be found that there are many ‘hidden’ indirect risks to the water service 
originating or being only controlled in a limited way, within water companies’ 
supply chains. For example the quality of asset product being sold to and 
consequently installed and operated by companies might change over time in 
a way which is not apparent or communicated to the buyer. Without iterative 
checks and product testing this could lead to reducing resilience of the system 
over time. 
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There was some evidence of an understanding of the reliability of key 
supplies but in general it was found that there was an inherent and generally 
unquestioned assumption that supplies and suppliers would remain reliable. 
In general the risk assessments supported this assumption but it is one of 
those areas where systems can be caught out and a system constantly 
improving its resilience would evidence continuing questioning of its supply 
chain and driving improvements and backup provisions to reduce risks in this 
area. Energy was one area where there were strong back arrangements for 
relatively short periods of time at critical assets, but otherwise little risk 
management. 
 
Feature Score 
Recognition of interdependencies with other organisations 4 
Understand reliability of key suppliers 2 
Contract provisions for calling on outsourced suppliers where necessary. 4 
Engage with the regulators. 4 
Good relationships with external agencies and effective communication 
channels 
3 
Plan in concert with other organisations 3 
Lobby effectively for others to reduce risk where there is a reliance. 2 
 
4.3.4.  Understanding risk 
 
A resilient water supply institution should be expected to understand the 
external hazards which can generate risks to the service. Therefore one 
would expect to see hazard analysis and risk assessment occurring on an 
iterative basis. Nationally, some of the relevant external hazards to water 
service are highlighted and assessed by government. The Government now 
sets out a national risk register which shows all the top risks to the UK. This 
includes those risks which affect essential services like water. Of these 
national risks, historically the water service has only been affected at a 
significant scale by severe weather (which includes a range of risks from very 
cold weather to windstorms), inland flooding, coastal flooding, and what might 
be classed as industrial accidents. Major attacks on water infrastructure have 
not occurred. This does not mean that they should not be considered when 
assessing the resilience of the service to external hazards. The research 
found that the industry was very strong at considering some of these national 
scale risks. For example reservoir flooding from dam failure is identified as a 
national-level risk by the Government and the water companies are 
responsible for risk assessment and asset management of many dams. In all 
the investigated areas it was found that dam risk assessment and 
management was approached with a large amount of resources and risk 
assessment and management was operated with very tight tolerances (i.e. 
there is a very low risk appetite in evidence). Lower-scale risks were being 
identified and assessed by the system itself on a routine basis and 
identification exercises in particular often involve expertise and experience 
form a wide range of backgrounds, thus ensuring a wide range of risks are 
captured and considered and progressed to risk management stages. 
However the research highlighted some minor shortcomings in 
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communicating these assessments across the whole system, and particularly 
to external agencies, even in circumstances where risk sharing might be of 
use in enhancing interdependency resilience. 
 
In general, risks to the water service which are conceivable but very unlikely 
and which have never occurred in England and Wales within the last century 
such as earthquake, plane crash and meteor strike were generally discounted 
and not included in company risk assessments. 
 
Apart from assessing and managing risks during operation of the system it is 
important that risks are considered in the design stage when changes are 
made to the system. System changes offer both opportunities (to reduce 
existing risks) and threats (to introduce new risks to service or exacerbate 
existing ones) and interventions can therefore increase or decrease the 
resilience of a water supply network. In asset design it was found that a wide 
range of different changes in contextual circumstances in and around the 
particular asset to be created and the consequences to service of possible 
changes to those circumstances were being considered, but not in all design 
changes. Methods for doing this included design risk assessments, access 
studies and Hazard and Operability studies. One shortcoming was identified 
where standards were being followed without corroborating risk assessments 
for the particular circumstance. 
 
Whilst these processes were generally discovered to be robust and effective 
when applied, it was clear that best-practice risk assessment was not being 
carried out in all circumstances. Examples were found of service failures 
which had occurred as a result of risks which would have been identified if a 
dedicated risk assessment and pre-emptive risk management process had 
been carried out following the commissioning of certain assets. 
 
Feature Score 
Identify risks to service 4 
Consider external hazards which are infrequent 3 
Consider super-extreme risks - even though they are unlikely it is useful 
to consider them as doing so can provide a helpful check on systems 
and processes.. 2 
Risk screening at a high level 4 
Risk assessment at company/business level 4 
Risk assessment at asset level 2 
Risk management 3 
Iterative assessment 3 
Risks shared 2 
 
4.3.5. Interventions 
 
A resilient organisation should be taking action to address risks it has 
identified. If this is not occurring then the service can be said to be 
deteriorating in resilience as the likelihood of one of the risks to service 
materialising increases.  Success on this area cannot be measured purely by 
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the money spent justified under a resilience driver (so called “inputs” rather 
than outcomes). There are also clear overlaps with other areas of 
expenditure. For example if a company is spending very little on proactive 
maintenance (as discussed in section 4.3.6) the likelihood of assets failing in 
such a way as to affect service would be expected to increase. 
 
Evidence was found of extensive interventions in companies’ business plans 
for the period 2010-2015 based on risk assessments carried out and driven by 
the need to address risks to service presented by external hazards and 
improve resilience. Key examples included asset-specific protection such as 
flood walls, electronics raised beyond flood levels, security measures and 
purchase and installation of spare capacity such as pumps and generators as 
well as much larger schemes such as construction of transfer links between 
different resource zones. There were also examples of engagement actions, 
for example instituting or extending water import arrangements with other 
water system operators in neighbouring geographic regions. Additionally there 
was strong evidence that in some cases resilience needs had influenced 
maintenance programmes, for example the research saw cases of pumps 
identified as critical single points of failure which on failure could impact 
service being prioritised for refurbishment even over pumps which might have 
been prioritised based on age and condition but which entailed a less critical 
effect on service if they were to fail. This evidence gives confidence that a 
wide range of types of solutions are being considered and that risk 
assessment was carried through to risk management. However the 
assessment does not go far enough to allow conclusions to be drawn about 
whether individual interventions are optimal, efficient and effective or not. This 
would require more detailed individual studies. 
 
One area of weakness was in quantifying differences in risk before and after 
interventions. This exercise was carried out in so far as it was necessary to 
get support from internal financial oversight groups but it was not clear that 
following project delivery the risks were again quantified and success 
assessed. There were also examples of some identified service risks being 
accepted without intervention and it was not clear that these risks would be 
reviewed in the future.  
 
Feature Score 
Addressing risk where it exists 3 
Propose and carry out resilience improvements 4 
Protected works. 3 
Restricted access and security 3 
Make and follow drinking water safety plans. 4 
Addressing interdependencies 2 
Solutions addressing multiple problems 3 
Quantifying differences made before and after interventions 2 
 
4.3.6. Maintenance 
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A large amount of time and resources are spent on maintaining the water 
network in ordinary conditions. This research did not analyse all aspects of 
maintenance as they are covered through other assessment methodologies. 
In general maintenance procedures are well-established and well-resourced 
which increases the resilience of the system. However the research 
highlighted specific cases where oversight of existing assets and procedures 
had led to deteriorating resilience in certain respects and consequently supply 
failures. This was found to have occurred where there was a lack of a 
maintenance regime on existing kit or an abandonment of existing techniques. 
For example, during the AMP4 period (2005-2010) one company did not 
operate a proactive maintenance regime for cathodic protection equipment – 
which can be used to effectively protect metal pipes from corrosion in certain 
ground conditions. This resulted in failure of pipes and service effects which 
would otherwise not have occurred. Reinstating this programme after 2010 
was found to reduce corrosion-related bursts on the protected mains 
significantly. Whilst it involved some additional up-front costs (capital and 
operational) there was a significant reduction in risk to service as a result – 
and hence an increase in service resilience. This example highlighted the 
point that increasing resilience often requires additional cost and therefore 
involves a trade off between cost and risk. This entails subjective decisions as 
explored in more detail in the research conclusions. 
 
Feature Score 
Responsive maintenance procedures (fix-on-fail) 4 
Asset condition investigations 2 
Proactive maintenance regimes. – service reservoirs, distribution, 
disinfection and treatment process control. 4 
Provisions for maintenance in different conditions 3 
Adequate equipment checks. 3 
Stringent maintenance and operation procedures 3 
Asset condition 3 
 
4.3.7. Response and Recovery 
 
Response and recovery performance can be improved by having plans and 
provisions in place for specific extreme events and testing these plans, as 
observed during the Mythe flooding. There was good evidence in the system 
of contingency plans both specific and generic, including multi-agency 
planning. However there were only a limited number of examples of dry runs 
and exercises for each of these plans, which can help improve plans and train 
and prepare staff for event occurrences. Evidence of response and recovery 
resilience features can be found by looking at reactive maintenance 
performance, which were generally found to be improving over time through 
concentrated programmes aimed at improving the response times, increasing 
the effectiveness of responses and placing the focus on end-service rather 
than assets themselves. The number of different risk response options 
available to operators in different areas has increased adding flexibility and 
this combined with the focus on end-service rather than simply specific asset 
performance  has likely increased the resilience of the system. 
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Some shortcomings were identified with staff availability. For example the 
research highlighted examples where the combined effect of the limited 
number of staff and statutory limitations on working hours, as set out in the 
working time directive, had led to risks over certain time periods where not 
enough staff would not have been available if a risk had occurred during that 
period. Similarly in some cases backup capacity in terms of equipment was 
found to be in shorter supply than desirable for a more resilient system and 
backup generators were only being rolled out across some sites because of 
resource limitations. In both these cases resilience could manifestly be 
increased but it would involve additional resources. 
 
Feature Score 
Procedures for emergencies – including extant manuals. 4 
Procedures tested through exercises 2 
Backup capacity (personnel) 3 
Backup capacity (equipment and resources) 2 
Plans specific to possible events 2 
Communication protocols 3 
Clear routes to notify others where there’s a public health risk for 
example (PCT, DWI) 4 
Flexibility in assets 3 
Flexibility in the network 3 
Spares. 2 
Backups (e.g. generators). 2 
 
 
4.3.8. Cultural 
 
The culture, motivations and enthusiasm of the people operating and 
influencing the water system has a strong impact on how resilient that system 
is. In some cases service failures have been caused by negligence, for 
example the Camelford incident mentioned in section 3, although this is rare. 
It is important from a resilience perspective that an institution maintains good 
staff morale and is made up of individuals who value the service and will work 
to protect it for customers. This is hard to measure but can be partly assessed 
through questionnaires and an assessment of the types of features present in 
the key organisations. The research found evidence of clear roles and 
responsibilities, clear lines of communication and positive attitudes. Working 
practices and management procedures also generally allowed for flexibility 
and open-handed approaches to problems and risks, which encourages 
honesty in raising problems and issues. 
 
Feature Score 
Staff who care about the service and reputation of the business 4 
Flexible working to cope 3 
Pro activity - looking for risks  3 
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Honesty (e.g. About failures - escalating to the right level). 3 
 
4.3.9. Good practice and learning 
 
From a resilience point of view it is important to learn from service failures 
over time and innovate to reduce risks. The research found examples of this 
behaviour for example after the management of incidents dedicated projects 
had been established following service failure events or near-misses to learn 
lessons and institute improvements. There were also examples of sharing 
learning and in some cases companies had established dedicated resilience 
fora where practice can be shared. However with time and resource 
pressures it was not clear whether this is receiving priority over more 
immediate concerns. The general inertia in the water industry for adopting 
new technologies and processes observed by the Cave review and others 
(Cave, 2009) was evident in this area (many design standards remain 
unchanged even where more robust alternatives are available on the market) 
but this isn’t necessarily a bad thing from a resilience point of view because 
there was evidence that new, untried technologies can introduce new risks to 
the system. In general the system approach was to carry out extensive risk 
assessment and testing of newer technologies in controlled environments in 
order to trial new technology without reducing service resilience in the system. 
Another area of potential weakness was a lack of assurance on emergency 
planning and on post-event reports. This reduces the level of confidence and 
may be an action which could improve resilience. 
 
Feature Score 
Good diagnostic procedure. 4 
Logs during incidents 4 
Meaningful lessons learned and procedures changed 3 
Incorporate changes in industry best practice 3 
Company-led innovation 2 
Assurance – for example process audits 2 
 
4.4. Discussion of results 
 
The overall results for all features are drawn together and shown in figure 13 
and figure 14 shows equivalent spider diagrams showing the score for each 
criteria within each sub-category. This is an example of how the assessment 
could be presented and used comparably with different systems. This would 
help enable quality checks of the assessment but would also enable good 
practice to be identified and shared for different features of resilience. 
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Figure 13 – Scoring spider diagram showing average score for each 
category  
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Figure 14 – Scoring spider diagrams for each resilience category. 
 
1
2
3
4
Staff can communicate with each other 
Understanding of network and 
particularly where critical failure points 
are located
An integrated understanding of the 
network over the whole geographic 
region of responsibility and an …
Good asset knowledge, reliable data 
(including of elements of the network out 
of control 
Good forecasting of deterioration and 
risk.
Linked into weather forecasting services.
Linked into flood forecasting centre 
(available to national category 2 
responders which includes water …
Strategic and Regional Flood Risk 
Assessments analysed in relation to 
network
Good hydrological understanding of the 
network and its consequent service time 
thresholds (e.g. How long a particular …
Monitoring and alerts.
Systems which react to alerts
Reliable water quality monitoring 
Network maps and knowledge available 
to relevant staff. (& up to date).
Information and Data
1
2
3
4
A clear overarching strategy for service 
with concise, clear messages. 
Clear definitions and prioritisation
Relevant key performance indicators
Overall approach – a ‘corporate resilience 
strategy’ 
Tolerances - what sorts of things the 
company is willing to accept and what are 
unacceptable.
Governance: Clear responsibilities for 
staff and others
Appropriate (positive) incentives and 
penalties
Clarity throughout organisation
Strategy
1
2
3
4
Recognition of interdependencies with 
other organisations
Understand reliability of key suppliers
Contract provisions for calling on 
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4
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extant manuals.
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Backup capacity (equipment and 
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there’s a public health risk for example 
(PCT, DWI)
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1
2
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4
Staff who care about the service and 
reputation of the business
Flexible working to cope
Pro activity - looking for risks 
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to the right level).
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practice
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Good Practice and Learning
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This methodology and presentation approach also enables an assessor to 
identify and suggest areas of improvement to the system. For example, figure 
14 indicates that the organisation could improve its links to weather and flood 
forecasting services. The assessment suggested that resilience could be 
improved if risk assessments were shared more readily and that more 
exercises and spare and backup operational equipment would help the 
system become more resilient. As noted in the strategy section one area for 
improvement would also be to set a company target for the level of risk to 
service expected after a period of time and establishing ways to measure and 
monitor improvements over time. However, doing this is recognised as a 
difficult exercise and must involve some subjective value judgements as 
discussed in section 5 and complex engagement with regulators and 
stakeholders about what is the desirable level of service and what customers 
would be willing to pay to achieve different levels of resilience. It is worth 
noting that such areas for improvement are suggested independently of any 
consideration of cost or equity considerations and also environmental 
considerations, but it is clear that the assessment can offer a way to highlight 
low cost measures of improving resilience (for example sharing risk 
assessments). Some resilience improvement measures have significant 
environmental impacts, such as the embodied greenhouse gases involved in 
the manufacture and transportation of concrete for conventional flood 
defences which must be considered and balanced in the sector. 
 
As the research progressed it was found that some of the original criteria 
needed to be amended or additional criteria added, so it is likely that if this 
method were applied more widely, the criteria, and particularly the definitions 
might be expected to change over time. An additional exercise which would 
add value and make the method easier to apply would be to gather and add 
examples for each level of scoring under each criteria in a more robust way 
than has been done in this research. This would enable greater comparability 
of results. 
 
It would be possible to use this assessment approach to measure change 
over time, by revisiting the same system after a period of time and assessing 
it on the same basis. This would be particularly useful in assessing the degree 
to which a system has improved following a particular hazard. As noted earlier 
the Mythe flooding events in 2007 prompted a number of changes in the 
sector, the degree of which can be assessed using this approach. An example 
for some of the features from the resilience principles is given in table 5 
below. The first score was given based on a view of performance against the 
criteria from before July 2007, judged from an historic view of the company’s 
systems and processes. Whilst the second score represents a view of 
performance against the criteria as of 2012, taking a judgement based on 
existing systems and processes. 
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Table 5 – Example of assessment at two points in time 
Feature Score – pre 2007 Score - 2012 
Addressing risk where it 
exists 
2 3 
 
Propose and carry out 
resilience improvements 
2 4 
Protected works. 2 3 
Restricted access and 
security 
3 3 
 
In this case the study showed clear examples which justify an improved score, 
for example the institution of a programme of asset-specific risk screening and 
assessment and the specific inclusion of asset protection schemes in the 
company's five year business plan. However in some areas, in this case 
security, there was little evidence of a significant change. 
 
Clearly this method is highly subjective and to be applied rigorously would 
require multiple assessors and comparability between different systems. The 
development of examples of scoring under each criteria would also be helpful 
in enabling consistent assessment. However it demonstrates how an 
approach which might be used to judge how resilient a particular system is 
compared to another, whether its resilience has improved over time, whether 
there are particular weaknesses which can be rectified and improved and 
possibly in the event of a failure of resilience such as assessment could 
suggest where some of the causes of failure lay. 
 
5. Measuring resilience – conclusions 
 
Key Conclusions 
 Analysis of service performance data is an important starting point in 
assessing resilience. 
 Qualitative analysis of systems and processes and the degree to which 
they affect the resilience of the water service is possible. 
 The outcomes of this research suggest a service generally improving in 
resilience over time. 
 More evidence was found to support the argument that the water 
service in England and Wales is resilient as opposed to Brittle. 
 An approach based on service performance analysis combined with a 
qualitative assessment of processes and systems could be used to 
suggest ideas for improvements and assess changes in resilience over 
time. 
 These approaches are subject to a number of limitations and 
uncertainties. 
 A fuller understanding of service resilience would require a 
complimentary assessment of risks to the system. 
 
The research developed a method of assessing water service resilience and 
tested that approach – using high level service data for the industry in 
England and Wales and then by studying one particular system in relation to a 
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set of features which you would expect to see as part of a resilient water 
supply system. It was found that it is possible to arrive at a view of the level of 
resilience of service by looking at performance data and processes and 
systems against a set of criteria. However this view is still clearly imperfect as 
it is subject to a number of key limitations. Foremost amongst these limitations 
is that such an assessment does not actually tell us very much about the risks 
to the system, it only indicates how likely it is that risks have been understood 
and addressed. 
 
Recently the regulator has suggested measuring progress towards a 
generally defined 'outcome' by assessing whether a company has met certain 
milestones (Ofwat, 2012). This may be an approach regulators could adopt in 
the absence of better information. It would be an improvement in levels of 
understanding about the resilience of service in different areas. Milestones 
could be set and tracked in a similar form to that explored in section 3, looking 
at historic service failures over time and in relation to certain extreme events. 
One would expect there to be a correlation between good performance 
against the criteria explained in section 4 and a resilient system. However, 
further work would be required to apply the framework to a number of 
companies and assess its validity over time in relation to service information 
analysed in a similar way to that explored in section 3. In terms of analysis of 
service levels and the hazards which cause failures, further work could be 
done comparing service failures with hazards at increasing levels of 
granularity. This analysis gives strong clues about how resilient a particular 
system is, and can be applied at various different levels. The smaller the focus 
of the assessment, the more insight can be gained into historic risks and 
failures. 
 
It must be noted that this research has tried to leave out of account cost and 
equity considerations and value judgements on what the 'appropriate' level of 
resilience might be. A crucial element in resilience planning must include 
setting an aim. It is therefore impossible to answer the question – is the water 
service resilient enough – without some value judgements about what enough 
is. This requires concerted discussion and understanding about the costs of 
increasing or decreasing resilience and the levels of service which customers 
are willing to bear. 
 
Finally, whilst this research has shown that the UK water service can certainly 
improve in terms of resilience, the research strongly suggests that the current 
service in England and Wales is perhaps as resilient a water service as has 
ever existed. It is possible therefore to give a qualified answer to the original 
research question and conclude that there is very little evidence to support the 
argument that the water service in England and Wales is ‘Brittle’.  
 
Certainly, compared to other areas of the world customers in England and 
Wales bear very little risk of water supply disruption (World Health 
Organisation, 2009). More work could be done to establish the most optimal 
paths to a resilient water service in countries which have not yet achieved 
stable and safe drinking water supplies. Conversely more work could also be 
done to establish whether there are other water services which have achieved 
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even lower levels of disruptions than in England and Wales and how we could 
learn from improvements there. 
 
A number of areas for further work were identified throughout the research. 
These are collected and summarised below: 
 
 Supplement the service failure analysis above using numbers of 
customer complaints rather than recorded service failures. 
 Investigating potential biases in company explanations of failure events 
and the nature of the political relationships driving this. 
 Carry out a more in-depth comparative analysis of the Northern Ireland 
water service failures.  
 Investigate the resilience of systems and organisations within the water 
companies' supply chains, within which lie many less-well understood 
risks. 
 Apply a similar resilience assessment framework to other water supply 
systems in England and Wales to enable comparative analysis. 
 Apply a resilience assessment framework to one system at multiple 
points in time to test whether it is an effective way to reveal changes 
over time. 
 A more in-depth comparison of service failures with hazards at 
increasing levels of granularity. 
 A study of optimal paths to resilience. 
 International resilience analysis; how does England and Wales 
compare with the service in other countries and are there more resilient 
water services elsewhere in the world? 
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